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From a theoretical perspective the link between the speed and scope of rapid labor
reallocation and productivity growth or income inequality is ambiguous. Do reallocations
with more flows tend to produce higher productivity growth? Does such a link appear at
the expense of higher income inequality? We explore the rich evidence from earlier studies
on worker flows in the period of massive and rapid labor reallocation, i.e. the economic
transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy in Central and Eastern
Europe. We have collected over 450 estimates of job flows from the literature and used
these inputs to estimate the short-run and long-run relationship between labor market flows,
labor productivity and income inequality. We apply the tools typical for a meta-analysis
to verify the empirical regularities between labor flows and productivity growth as well as
income inequality. Our findings suggest only weak and short term links with productivity,
driven predominantly by business cycles. However, data reveal a strong pattern for income
inequality in the short-run - more churning during reallocation is associated with a level
effect towards increased Gini indices.
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Both positive and adverse economic shocks often necessitate a change in the allocation of capital
and labor between industries (cfr. Blanchard et al. 2014). Over the recent Great Recession, large
structural shifts were observed in both the US (e.g. Elsby et al. 2010, Herkenhoff and Ohanian
2011) and the European economies (e.g. Burda et al. 2011, Van Dalen and Henkens 2013, Anghel
et al. 2014, Hogrefe and Sachs 2014). Sectoral reallocation can play a considerable part in rein-
forcing the recessionary pressure, as argued by Aaronson et al. (2004), Herkenhoff and Ohanian
(2011) and Amable and Mayhew (2011) amongst others. As emphasized by Hogrefe and Sachs
(2014), labor reallocation in both advanced and emerging economies intensified recently. The
question arises whether these reallocations should happen with laissez-faire churning. Perhaps
without a policy intervention churning becomes excessive, bringing about productivity and wel-
fare losses in the course of adjustment.
Theoretical foundations to this question have been developed in models envisioning a flow
of workers from a shrinking to an expanding sector. In the context of economic transition, the
theoretical underpinnings to this debate were provided by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) who
operationalized the concept of the optimal speed of transition. With further refinements, these
models try to capture the process of a decline in the inefficient sector and the emergence of a new
sector, with workers forced to relocate from jobs in the old sector to those in the new emerging
firms.1 In the context of a sectoral change, a similar approach was proposed in a series of theo-
retical contributions by Caballero and Hammour (1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2000), who conceptualize
reallocation as a flow of workers between industries. Following these two conceptualizations,
faster and synchronized labor reallocation should be conducive to labor productivity with a po-
tential welfare trade off associated with temporary increase in income inequality due to churning.
Moreover, de-synchronized, i.e. excessively fast, job destruction rates can reinforce the upward
pressure on income inequality, but should have little or no effect on labor productivity growth.
After nearly three decades since the onset of economic transition in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE), the experience from CEE countries can provide useful insights into the empirical
validity of the theoretical predictions. With a varied performance across the transition economies,
country level studies can at best demonstrate the consequences of particular policy choices, but
they cannot provide a general overview of the link between the speed of workers' reallocation
and economic performance (see Fidrmuc 2003, Aristei and Perugini 2012, Peev and Mueller 2012,
Amin and Djankov 2014). In analyzing the worker flows in transition economies one encounters
a methodological challenge of how one ought to capture the best policy measure associated
with worker flows. Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) rely on a measure used widely in the literature,
namely the level and speed of privatization. Yet the government's ability to privatize at a
certain moment depends crucially on the contemporaneous economic performance, reinforcing the
obvious link between business cycles and worker flows. Moreover, flows become dependent upon
initial conditions (see BenYishay and Grosjean 2014). In addition, privatization may mean both
job flows (with new private owners preserving employment level in former state-owned enterprise)
1Naturally, there is also a second strand of the theoretical literature, which focuses on the political economy
aspects of shock therapy, see Marangos (2002) for an overview while Rovelli and Zaiceva (2013), Murtin and
Wacziarg (2014) provide recent extensions.
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and worker flows (with new private owners reducing jobs in a formerly state-owned enterprise).
Privatization indicators may also overlook significant flows (e.g. a state-owned enterprise going
bankrupt without being privatized with workers being forced to seek employment elsewhere).
Consequently, analyses using privatization as a measure of labor market reallocation cannot
satisfactorily capture the workers and jobs flows  a channel of key policy interest.
Attractive alternatives to the speed and level of privatization would be indicators of worker
flows. However, most transition countries were not collecting data on gross worker flows. Data on
net worker flows have been collected in national labor force surveys of most transition economies
from mid-to-late 1990s, but these indicators  usually calculated as a change over time in the
level of employment by sector and/or ownership category  are contaminated by job-to-job flows
within sectors and ownership categories, as well as flows from and into non-employment. Finally,
in analysis of this type, it would be desirable to compare worker flows with job creation and
job destruction. These indicators are also affected by the discrepancies between gross and net
measures  it is possible that in a given time period an enterprise or sector experienced no or
negligible net flows while having substantial gross flows.
These data requirements and limited availability of data have affected the literature. First,
most studies cover one or at the most few countries. Second, they often rely on dedicated data
sets (such as incidental surveys), which limits the number of years for which analyses could be
performed. Third, because different authors used data from different sources on different coun-
tries in different periods, they are rarely directly comparable. Finally, authors have addressed
the research question with different methodologies and variables (e.g., job flows vs. worker flows,
net measures vs. gross indicators and different model specifications). Thus, synthesizing the
results is not a simple task.
Our objective is to contribute to the literature using the tools from a meta-analysis. Exploit-
ing the results from a wide variety of studies, we address the question of whether a larger scope
of worker reallocation is associated with higher rate of productivity growth and higher (dispos-
able) income inequality. While the academic and policy relevance of this question is obvious,
providing an answer would not be feasible if one were to rely on data from only one or a few
countries. A meta-analysis allows researchers to partially overcome the constraints imposed by
data availability. We also test the validity of these results using a comprehensive recent dataset
on worker flows in CEE countries during the period of economic transition.
Given its diversity, the evidence from the economic transition in CEE is of a wider appeal for
at least two reasons. First, it provides a large quasi -experiment, with a set of countries pursuing
unique policy mix at differentiated rates. The evidence gathered in these case and cross-sectional
studies can constitute a relatively general guidance for other countries experiencing large scale
labor reallocation.2 Second, given the time elapsed since the beginning of the transition, the
long-term effects can already be observed.
We find that the link between job flows and productivity is weak, mostly contemporaneous,
and that it occurs mainly through job creation/hiring. On the other hand, we show that the
link between job flows and inequality is strong and robust. In the short run, higher job flows
tend to be associated with increasing income inequality. In the long run, the effects come mostly
2Conceptually, the links have already been made to China (Sachs et al. 1994, Buck et al. 2001), India (Sachs
1995, Sen 1998) and Iraq (Looney 2004).
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from job creation/hiring. These findings suggest that it is the lack of synchronization between
job creation and job destruction that contributes to less equal economic outcomes. However, the
fact that the strong correlation is between inequality and job creation/hiring suggests that it is
wage dispersion in the newly created jobs rather than insufficient social safety nets that drives
income inequality. Overall, the links postulated by the theory do not find much support in the
data. In addition, they seem to have been mitigated by a number of factors unaccounted for in
the literature. One important factor may be the scale and scope of job destruction/separation
in the emerging sectors as opposed to the decaying ones.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the the-
oretical link between the speed of labor reallocation during the transition and the productivity
dynamics. In Section 3 we describe the procedure of collecting the data for this quantitative
analysis of the literature. Section 4 provides an overview of the findings in the literature, elabo-
rating on the cross-country differences as well as time trends. Finally, in Section 5 we employ the
meta-analysis tools to quantify the strength of the link between the productivity and the speed
of labor reallocation. In this section we also provide the cross-validation with the alternative
sources of data. The concluding section summarizes the policy implications of our study.
2 Theoretical insights
There are two perspectives on labor reallocation: job flows and worker flows. Job flows are
obtained from firm-level data and represent the change in the number of employees within a
period of time. Worker flows correspond to the movement of workers in and out of the companies
as well as in and out of the labor market.3 In an extreme case, if all workers swapped firms,
net and gross job flows would be equal to zero, net worker flows would be equal to zero and
gross worker flows would be twice the number of workers. Job destruction in the decaying sector
as well as the job creation in the emerging sector can occur in three different forms: ownership
change (e.g. privatization), shut-down or a combination of the two. With pure ownership change,
workers stay in the firm, i.e. job destruction and creation occurs with no worker flows. However,
if a company exits the market and a new sector emerges  as is posited by theories of the optimal
speed of transition  workers flow between jobs in different companies, possibly with a spell of
unemployment between the two jobs. Redundancies in the presence of ownership change come
from the new owner reducing employment, thus causing job destructions and forcing worker flows
in both gross and net terms.
The distinction between job and worker flows is not only important conceptually but also
empirically. Analyzing gross worker flows typically requires individual-level data, such as those
collected in labor force surveys whereas gross job flows can only be studied with firm-level
databases. To analyze net flows  for both workers and jobs  it is sufficient to rely on more readily
available aggregate statistics, such as the overall change in sectoral employment or firm-level
change in headcount, within a given time period such as one year. Given the well documented
lack of reliable information at the level of individuals or detailed employment statistics for firms,
3In the reminder of this paper, we refer to job flows for job creation and destruction, and to worker flows for
hirings and separations.
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a large part of the literature has focused on net worker flows or net job flows, see Davis and
Haltiwanger (1996). This has important consequences for building a link between theoretical
models and empirical analyses. Specifically, the former typically impose two stylized features:
firms only adjust one way (i.e. gross and net flows are equivalent) and model mechanics focus
on gross worker flows.
The influential model of Aghion and Blanchard (1994), which provides an intuitive mechanism
relating labor reallocation to productivity, is no exception from this rule. An economy has two
sectors: incumbent inefficient public sector and private newcomers with an exogenous efficiency
advantage. With a government interested in maximizing output, privatization and making room
for the private sector is the only strategy, but the focus of the model lies in the speed at which
it is optimal to pursue privatization. By destroying jobs in the public sector, the state makes
the workers available for hire in the private sector. Shrinking the size of the state sector has two
opposing effects. First, redundant workers seeking a new job generate downward wage pressure,
facilitating job creation in the private sector. Second, with a growing pool of unemployed workers,
the need for social nets emerges, funded by taxing labor and thus creating a wedge between the net
wage and cost of employment. Consequently, excessive job destruction may actually diminish job
creation. Depending on the synchronization between a downward pressure on wage expectations
of the job seekers and an upward pressure on non-wage employment costs, the economy can pursue
transition on a balanced path of fairly low unemployment or enter an unstable equilibrium with
unemployment fluctuating at relatively high levels4
The Aghion and Blanchard (1994) framework with its subsequent extensions5, provides in-
sights into the possible link between worker reallocation and economic efficiency. On the one
hand, excessive reallocation implies unstable equilibria with high unemployment, thus lowering
social cohesion and increasing inequality - both in terms of level and in relative terms to the
pre-transition situation. On the other hand, higher unemployment may be consistent with the
selection into employment of only more productive individuals as well as faster adjustment from
misallocation to optimal allocation of both capital and labor. Consequently, a larger scope of
worker reallocation  more churning  would be associated with higher productivity growth.
However, any job destruction even if synchronized with job creation rates could imply that
 due to imperfect information and lengthy churning  many productive workers take longer to
secure a lasting adequate match after a change in the economy structure. Thus, higher speed
of transition could also be associated with a lower productivity growth, since a long matching
process represents an efficiency loss, i.e. it lowers the relation between the actual and potential
productivity level and thus growth. While the transition economies experienced job and worker
flows  through privatizations and bankruptcy/redundancies in varying proportions  their effects
on productivity and inequality are bound to differ. Pure privatization should imply a positive
effect on productivity with no paramount effect on inequality in the short run (i.e. until new
4The objective of the government was not relevant for the empirical literature and thus we do not focus
on it. The key feature of the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model that attracted research attention was the
synchronization between the job destruction and job creation and the consequences of the de-synchronization in
terms of unemployment and wages.
5The extensions encompass various aspects of the reallocation process. Boeri (2000), Balla et al. (2008)
introduced heterogeneity among workers, Papapanagos and Sanfey (2003) introduced the possibility of migration,
Tichit (2006) accounted for inactivity and Bruno (2006) allowed for job destruction in the private sector.
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wage structure emerges). Firm shut-downs and mergers generate worker flows, thus necessitating
the channels such as de-synchronization and unstable equilibria, misallocation as well as possibly
lengthy churning  see Beauchemin and Tasci (2014) as well as Mukoyama (2014) for a recent
theoretical treatment.
Summarizing, the optimal speed of transition theory provides some grounds to expect a
positive link between job destruction, or excess job destruction, and income inequality, but the
models have little predictive power for job creation as well as net/gross worker flows. In terms
of a link to productivity, both positive and negative correlations are possible on theoretical
grounds, the coefficients should be larger for job destruction and creation than for hirings and
separations. Moreover, these effects can be lasting  such as efficiency loss due to lengthy
churning or misallocation  but need not be. It is the objective of this paper to put these
theoretical predictions to empirical test. We collect the estimates on job and worker flows from
the literature and complement them with worker flows data obtained from Living in Transition
Survey by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We test explicitly the
contemporaneous and long-term links between labor market flows and labor productivity as well
as income inequality
3 Sampling of studies
We obtained the list of articles for our quantitative analysis from EconLit.6 In the initial sample
we included all published articles and book chapters in English appearing under the key words:
reallocation and transition. From this list we excluded studies that were purely theoretical
or relied only on simulations.
The search generated 131 papers, of which 16 were not in English and 19 were theoretical or
simulation exercises. We reviewed each of the remaining 96 papers and eliminated 67 papers that
were unrelated to labor reallocation (e.g. those dealing with financial flows and land property
changes).To limit the risk that a relevant paper remains unaccounted for, we carefully explored
the references list of the relevant studies. This additional search increased the number of papers
by 5.
An inspection of the relevant papers indicated that they vary in terms of model specification,
data and variables as well as statistics reported. Given the focus of our research, we used
papers that contained conceptually comparable estimates of labor market flows for the transition
economies. Thus, our quantitative analysis includes all studies which reported usable7 estimates
of job flows (whether job creation and destruction or hirings and separations) for the transition
6See Stanley and Jarrell (2005) for the comparison of validity between EconLit and GoogleScholar as well as
other sources. Given that the literature we analyze dates mostly to the 1990s and 2000s, our focus on published
papers does not seem to impose an excessively binding constraint on the selection of papers.
7Jurajda and Terrell (2003) include a graphical analysis of flows in Czech Republic and Estonia, but not the
numerical results. We also could not use all the estimates from Walsh (2003) as in some cases, the author reports
only the sum of job creation and job destruction, making the estimates of the underlying flows undecipherable.
Turunen (2004) includes a transition matrix, but not the number of individuals initially in each state. Schaffner
(2011) provides comparison between East and West Germany aggregated over time. Earle (2012) presents both
limitations: the transition matrix does not allow to recover the size of the flows and the flows are calculated over
periods longer than one year.
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economies of Central and Eastern Europe.8 Within the sample of articles on transition economies,
we could not include papers which do not report suitable information. In total, 18 articles
comprised the relevant indicators for the CEE countries during the economic transition (see
Table 1).
Table 1: List of studies included in the analysis
Reference Period Country Data # of estimates
Konings et al. (1996) 1987-1991 Poland Firm 23
Bojnec and Konings (1998) 1990-1995 Slovenia F-Dedicated 11
Bilsen and Konings (1998) 1990-1994 Bulgaria & Hungary F-Dedicated 27
Romania
Sorm and Terrell (2000) 1994-1999 Czech Republic Individual 5
Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) 1996-1997 Russia Firm 26
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) 1989-1995 Estonia Individual 108
Brown and Earle (2002) 1985-1998 Russia Firm 38
Brown and Earle (2003) 1990-2000 Russia Firm & F-Dedicated 40
Faggio and Konings (2003) 1994-1998 Bulg., Est., Slo. Amadeus 57
Pol. & Rom.
Konings et al. (2003) 1995-2000 Ukraine Amadeus 18
Walsh (2003) 1994-1996 Poland Individual and firm 36
Warzynski (2003) 1996-1999 Poland Amadeus 4
Masso and Heshmati (2004) 1992-2001 Estonia Individual 10
Brown and Earle (2006) 1992-2000 Ukraine Firm 8
Christev et al. (2008) 1993-2000 Ukraine Firm 7
De Loecker and Konings (2006) 1993-2000 Slovenia Firm 23
Siebertova and Senaj (2007) 2000-2004 Slovakia Firm 12
Gimpelson et al. (2010) 2004 Russia Firm 1
Note: Firm indicates the data come from a national registry of firms. F-Dedicated indicates data on
firms collected by the researcher. Amadeus indicates data that come from the Bureau van Dijk database.
In Table A.1 in the online appendix, the number of estimates is presented by country and year.
In total, the literature provides information on job flows in ten transition countries. These
studies present many common features. First, they all use annual data. On the one hand this is
suitable for the purposes of this quantitative analysis of the literature, as the reported estimates
are comparable in terms of time frame. On the other hand, yearly statistics necessarily overlook
flows with unemployment spells shorter than a year as well as seasonal flows  see Davis and
Haltiwanger (1996, for an overview of the consequences). Second, the studies refer to either firm-
level or individual-level flows, which again increases comparability, for there are no estimates of
e.g. plant-level worker or job flows. Third, due to data availability constraints, most studies focus
on one country, further highlighting the value of a comparative perspective.9 Fourth, although
8With these criteria, analyses on Danish data (Albæk and Hansen 2004), studies of the US economy (Davis
and Haltiwanger 1992, Golan et al. 2007, Walker 2013), and the works on China were dropped from further
analysis. While indeed China underwent significant changes in the employment structure over the last two
decades, reallocation in China is related to the urban/rural migrations and changes in the agricultural sector,
which are not captured by the models in the spirit of Aghion and Blanchard (1994), see Dong and Xu (2009).
9The few notable exceptions comprise Faggio and Konings (2003), where the authors compare flows for five
different economies and Bilsen and Konings (1998), which studies the behavior of firms in Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania. Note that Jurajda and Terrell (2003) have a comparative analysis of Estonia and the Czech Republic,
while Mitra et al. (2014) as well as Tyrowicz and van der Velde (2014) provide a comparative analysis, as they
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almost half of the papers were published over just a two-year period (2002-2003), all papers
except two focus on the first decade of the economic transition.
Apart from commonalities, this set of publications varies on two important accounts: the
measures and the data. Roughly two thirds of the papers employ firm-level data, while the
remaining use worker-level data, thus reporting estimates of hirings and separations. As to the
data, while all articles at worker level use national labor force surveys, the picture on firm level
data is less homogeneous. Articles from this group employed mostly data gathered by national
administrative bodies or statistical offices, followed by Amadeus and dedicated surveys. Also,
most of the estimates come form the early transition, as much as half of them are from the 1992
to 1996 period.
Different data sources placed constraints on the types of flows that could be observed. Anal-
yses based on Amadeus capture only net flows from and to large companies, as the threshold
for participating in the survey excludes small firms.10 While several articles distinguished the
dynamics of job flows by firm size according to the number of employees (small, medium, large,
very large), the categories overlap only partially. For example, Bojnec and Konings (1998) define
small firms are those employing less than 20 employees, for Siebertova and Senaj (2007) the
threshold value is less than 50 employees whereas for Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) use a defini-
tion of less than 5 employees. A similar problems arises when sectoral composition is considered.
Many country statistical offices surveyed only firms in the manufacturing sector, which may be
regarded as the heritage from the Material Production System for reporting the economic cate-
gories under central planning. Thus, even when all papers include the manufacturing sector in
their estimations of job creation and destruction, only half of them include a similar measure for
changes in the service sector. Finally, articles also differed on the treatment to different types of
ownership. While 16 papers include at least one estimation for the total economy, the analysis
of specific sectors is less frequent. Only nine papers provided separate analyses for the public
and the private sector.
Summarizing, in total the literature reports 454 estimates of flows in 18 articles, spanning the
years between 1985 and 2004 in 10 transition economies. In order to focus on reallocation due
to the economic transition, we limit our analysis to estimates reported for the time periods prior
to 2001, which results in the final dataset of 430 observations. In the subsequent sections we
move to an exploratory meta-analysis and an informal meta-regression to test intuitions on the
link between labor market flows on the one hand and on the other: labor productivity growth
as well as inequality.
4 Quantitative analysis of the studies
The quantitative analysis of the literature suggests that Estonia and Romania experienced the
highest job creation; while the lowest estimates come from Hungary and Ukraine, followed closely
employed international databases on firms and workers, respectively. However, even though both papers use
measures of job creation and destruction in their analysis, the estimates are not reported and hence these papers
were excluded from further analysis.
10Depending on the country and year, the Amadeus sample might be restricted by employment or by revenue
thresholds.
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by Poland and Bulgaria. In terms of job destruction, Poland, Slovakia, and Russia were the coun-
tries with the highest estimates. ANOVA test confirms that the estimates are all statistically
different. From Table 2 we infer that countries differed in terms of gross, net and excess reallo-
cation as well11. Besides Romania and Estonia, all countries in the sample experienced negative
net reallocation, which is consistent with the increase in unemployment and inactivity during
the period. The largest difference corresponds to Poland.
Table 2: Average job and worker flows
Country
Job Flows Worker flows
Job creation Job destruction Hirings Separations
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Bulgaria 4.62 9.54 6.90 3.54
Czech Republic 4.30 0.29 3.72 0.44
Estonia 12.95 22.76 8.87 5.10 26.95 26.43 22.70 10.27
Hungary 3.20 5.44 7.61 1.43
Poland 4.38 3.44 14.35 9.48 17.29 3.29 17.94 3.57
Romania 11.28 24.37 7.80 3.57
Russia 9.15 18.25 10.97 6.34 20.70 3.25 28.08 1.75
Slovenia 7.33 2.62 12.67 3.90
Slovakia 5.28 4.15 7.12 5.92
Ukraine 3.73 4.00 9.64 1.65
Overall 7.99 15.92 9.86 6.18 22.98 21.95 21.08 9.79
ANOVA test for F-stat. p-value F-stat. p-value F-stat. p-value F-stat. p-value
equality in means 2.02 0.04 6.53 0.00 2.33 0.08 10.27 0.00
Notes: The means are equivalent to effect sizes for a given type of flow and a country (averaged over
time). In Table A.2 in the Appendix we present the average values (effect sizes) of job creation and
destruction by country and year.
All countries except Bulgaria and Estonia appear to have a similar pattern: first, they experi-
enced lower levels of job creation in the early 1990s converging to approximately 5%. This figure
is much smaller than the 10% portrayed in the literature for mature economies in a comparable
period, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for the US. Estonia also converged to the 5% creation
rate, but from above. For the estimates of job destruction Estonia, Bulgaria and, to some extent,
Hungary and Poland experienced a surge in job destruction at the beginning of the period, and
then they gradually decrease to a number between 5% and 7%, which is slightly lower than the
rates observed in the US or UK, but similar to continental Western European countries (see
Davis and Haltiwanger 1996). In the Polish case, we observe a new increase in job destruction
by the end of the 20th century. For Russia and Ukraine job destruction rate increased gradually
throughout the entire period, whereas in the case of Slovenia it was fairly stable throughout the
entire analyzed period.
To analyze synthetically the properties of the estimates for data-sources, data types, countries
and periods, we conduct several regressions, exploiting the variation of the measured labor market
flows in the literature, see Table 3. It would not be accurate to call our analysis a meta-
11Gross, net and excess are three additional measures of reallocation. Gross is the sum of job creation and
destruction; net is the difference between creation and destruction, while excess is defined as gross flows minus
the absolute value of net flows.
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regression because studies typically do not report measures of precision for the estimates of
labor market flows. Moreover, we lack an adequate counterpart for the true effect explored
in other meta-analysis: there are no clear priors on what the value of these flows should be,
especially given the country, sector and time related heterogeneity and the use of different flow
measures -at worker and at jobs level. Given these constraints, we estimate a model with various
measures of labor market flow on the LHS and characteristics of the study on the RHS. We show
separately the estimates for job creation in columns (1) to (4) and job destruction in columns
(5) to (8). The first column in both sets of equations reports the average size of flows for a given
subsample of estimates. In the remaining columns, we introduce controls for article, country
and year. Adding these controls is meant to serve as a test on the robustness of the estimated
relationships between estimate properties and its variation.
Intuitively, estimates from the firm level data tend to be much lower than those from a
worker level, as revealed by the comparison between the top and the bottom panel of columns
(1) and (4). Naturally, part of the difference might be a by-product of other characteristics of
the estimates; for example, ownership and industry specificity. Notably job creation appears to
be lower in manufacturing than in the service sector; the pace of job destruction was remarkably
even across industries. Also  contrary to our initial expectations  public sector was not just
shrinking. Admittedly, it was much less active job creation, the values are large and positive. In
terms of job destruction, the public sector was comparable to the rest of the economy. Finally,
smaller firms12 prove to be more dynamic than larger ones as they accommodated shocks by
adjusting labor demand. There may also be a selection bias, as small firms are more likely to
belong to the private sector.
These insights do not conform with the narrative of Aghion and Blanchard (1994), and
subsequent theoretical contributions. When it comes to creation, public, manufacturing and
large firms seem to be characterized by lower estimates of the flows. Thus, theories of transition
were right in pointing towards the slower job creation in the old sector but might have missed
the point when portraying the emerging sector as stable. In fact, both job creation and job
destruction estimates are larger when samples were restricted to small firms
Summarizing, this exploratory quantitative analysis reveals three important regularities.
First, the rate of the reforms is reflected in different paths in job creation and job destruc-
tion: countries that followed a gradualist approach are characterized by relatively stable rates
for both creation and destruction, but also excess destruction seems to be fairly large. On the
other hand, some of the countries that followed the so-called shock therapy are characterized
with fluctuating job creation and destruction rates, as well as fluctuating excess destruction.
Estonia is an exception, since this country only experienced excess destruction towards the end
of 1990s. Second, insights from the literature confirm only some of the theoretical predictions:
large and public firms were characterized by lower job creation, whereas smaller and private firms
by larger job creation. Both characteristics resemble those from advanced market economies, see
Davis and Haltiwanger (1996). Yet, important predictions of the optimal speed of transition
12Articles did not provide a consistent criterion to distinguish between large and small firms; authors tend to
employ different, not always overlapping, cut-off values. Nonetheless, we define small firms as those with less than
50 employees. When the authors selected less than 100 employees as the smallest category, we consider that the
estimates contained both small and large firms.
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Table 3: Estimates of labor market flows: exploratory analysis
Variable Job creation Job destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Studies reporting job flows
Only public 9.95 -3.45*** -6.24*** -6.68*** 10.32 -0.21 -0.73 -0.66
(0.88) (1.66) (2.06) (0.94) (0.97) (0.72)
Only manufacturing 13.22 -7.36*** -7.63*** -8.05*** 10.04 2.34*** -0.57 -0.85
(2.08) (2.14) (2.39) (0.75) (0.72) (0.60)
Only large firms 9.63 -3.74*** -3.86** -3.87** 10.44 0.21 -1.06 -1.29*
(1.63) (2.03) (2.14) (0.72) (1.08) (0.87)
Only small firms 6.18 11.96*** 5.02 4.76 9.30 7.81*** 4.25*** 3.80***
(4.04) (4.23) (4.56) (1.62) (1.49) (1.34)
Fixed effects for country No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed effects for year No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed effects for article No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
# of observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
R2 0.174 0.228 0.253 0.214 0.484 0.615
Studies reporting worker flows
Only public 2.04 -10.0** -28.7*** -28.7*** 9.98 3.9* -2.6 -2.6
(5.8) (9.5) (9.8) (2.6) (3.6) (2.5)
Only manufacturing 3.09 -6.4 -25.1*** -25.1*** 10.56 4.5** -2.0 -2.0
(5.9) (9.8) (10.0) (2.7) (3.9) (2.7)
Only large firms 4.28 -21.6*** -31.8*** -31.8*** 9.40 10.8 6.1 6.1
(7.2) (9.5) (9.5) (9.4) (9.6) (8.7)
Only small firms 24.02 -3.0 -13.2 -13.2 16.10 3.3 -1.4 -1.4
(7.8) (10.2) (9.7) (2.7) (2.7) (1.8)
Fixed effects for country No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed effects for year No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed effects for article No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
# of observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
R2 0.102 0.264 0.291 0.127 0.315 0.642
Notes: Average flows reported in columns (1) and (5). Average job creation computed at worker level amounts
to 24.51, and 8.73 at firm level (with a t − statistic of the equality test -6.00). OLS estimation in columns
(2)-(4) and (6)-(8). Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 repetitions presented in parentheses. ***,**,* in-
dicate significance at the 5%, 10% and 15% level respectively. For job destruction the respective numbers are
21.96 and 10.27, with a t− statistic of -11.61. Results for gross flows, net flows and excess flows available in
Table B.1 in the Appendix.
theory are not fully confirmed. Namely, data suggest that public and private firms had similar
destruction rates. All transition economies analyzed in this survey gradually converge towards
job creation and destruction rates between 5% and 7%. Plausibly, by the end of the period
covered in the studies, labor market in these countries became fairly similar to advanced market
economies. Given these disparities in the paths and eventual convergence, in the next section we
explore the link between job flows, on the one hand, and productivity and income inequality, on
the other.
The estimates from Table 3 are suggestive of one more insight: to provide a reliable analysis
of the dispersion of job flows one needs to control for the characteristics of the data set. To
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this end, in the subsequent analyses we will use two types of indicators. First, we have the raw
estimates of job flows provided in the literature. Second, we also use the residuals from the
regressions portrayed in Table 3. We calculate the residuals from the second column of each
flow, which allows us to preserve country and time specific effects, while at the same time we
control for differences among the estimates.13 These residuals convey the dispersion cleaned of
the effects associated with the source of the data and the types of units covered.
5 The links to productivity and income inequality
Our objective in this paper is to analyze whether more churning during massive labor realloca-
tion translates to higher productivity growth and whether it happens at the expense of higher
income inequality. To this end, we present two types of evidence. First, we estimate contempo-
raneous correlations between alternative measures of job reallocation on the one hand and labor
productivity growth and the Gini index, on the other. We refer to these measures as short-term
correlations. Second, we inquire about the long-term relationship between the variables of in-
terest. Data on labor productivity growth come from the Conference Board, whereas data on
income inequality were obtained from World Income Inequality Database, see Appendix C for
details.
The analysis on the estimates from the literature is complemented with data from Life in
Transition Survey (henceforth, LiTS) - a recent alternative source collected by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This is a retrospective study administered in 2006
in 29 transition economies. Detailed data on employment history were collected, thus permitting
computation of worker flows for a large sample of transition economies. We present the com-
parison between the estimates from the literature and the rates computed on data from LiTS in
Appendix D.
5.1 Short-term correlations
In Table 4, we present the short-term correlation between different measures of job reallocation
as well as productivity growth and the Gini index, respectively. Before we discuss the actual
estimates, it is worth pointing out that, theoretically, both job destruction and job creation
should matter contemporaneously for the changes in productivity and inequality. Periods of
recessionary pressure leading to higher job destructions are also periods of lower productivity
growth. However, if firings were indicative of Schumpeterian creative destruction, productivity
growth should be faster in these periods. Analogous reasoning applies to job creation. Also the
relationship between job flows and inequality need not be causal. During periods of recessions,
income inequality is likely to increase.14 The opposite holds for the upturns of the business cycle.
Another important factor concerns the sample composition. As evident from Table 2 we
have data on both worker and job flows for only a small number of countries. This the case of
Estonia, Poland and Russia, although sometimes periods differ. In the case of Czech Republic, the
literature provides only estimates for gross worker flows, whereas in the remaining six countries,
13Unlike Table 3 the residuals come from a regression without a constant.
14See Burkhauser et al. (1999), Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006), Hoover et al. (2009) for a detailed treatment.
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only job flows were reported in earlier studies. Thus, if the estimates for the net and gross flows
differ, it may be both due to the economic processes and/or due to country specificity in the
sample composition. To address this point, we also provide estimates based on LiTS data, which
are conceptually comparable to gross worker flows.
In Table 4, we provide a variety of specifications to account for the different measures of
flows. First, in columns (1) to (3), we include the estimates for the raw values from the literature,
separating the estimates for the gross worker flows and net job flows. However, these estimates
can be excessively noisy due to the variation coming from the type of flows analyzed in the
literature (e.g. only public sector or only manufacturing). Given that these distinctions might
affect our result, as demonstrated by Table 3, we control for them following a two-step procedure:
we regress our dependent variables of interest on the paper characteristics (without year or
country dummies) and then we regress inequality and productivity measures on the residuals
from the previous stage. Consequently, in the second set of specifications, the explanatory
variable is a residual from a specification that accounts for various properties of the data and
measures. We display these results for the full set of available estimates in columns (4)-(5).
Finally, we provide conceptually comparable estimations where the measures of flows come from
LiTS. We provide three specifications from the LiTS data: for the same years and countries
as in the literature  columns (6) for (2) and (8) for (3)  for the same countries as in the
literature but all years  columns (7) and (9), analogously; and for all the available countries
and years in column (10). The intuition behind these three specifications is to disentangle the
differences between the estimates obtained on the literature and the estimates obtained for the
LiTS data into those that can be attributable to different sample structure and those that can
be attributable to differences in measures of flows
We find a fairly weak and negative relationship between job destruction and productivity
growth for the estimates from the literature. While the estimates are consistently negative, they
lose significance in the case of the indicators for the worker flows. Since the lack of significance
may come from the lower power due to lower number of observations, we turn to the estimates
based on LiTS data for confirmation. In fact, comparable estimates from LiTS are also insignif-
icant for the countries and years analyzed in the literature, so the lack of significance is not a
consequence of insufficient power. However, for a longer time span as well as a wider selection of
transition economies the link to productivity is negative and significant  column (10) of Table 4.
This result suggests that quantitatively the recession explanation dominates the Schumpeterian
explanation, with a substantial country level heterogeneity. For job creation, the correlations
with productivity are insignificant in the literature. However, when we rely on LiTS data, even
for the same countries as in the literature, the results become significant and positive  columns
(8) to (10) in Table 4. This positive correlation  even if not very robust  further strength-
ens the interpretation that business cycle is the mitigating factor in between job creation and
productivity growth in the transition economies.
For both job creation and job destruction we come to the mechanical explanation dominating
the Schumpeterian notion of reallocation due to creative destruction.15 While contemporaneous
correlations may be insufficient to demonstrate this link, we also try an alternative specification:
15The results for other measures of labor market flows  net reallocation, gross reallocation and excessive
reallocation  are reported in Table E.1 in Appendix. By and large they confirm these patterns.
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instead of labor productivity growth year on year we use the chain index. We treat the last decade
before the transition as basis (compute an average over these 10 years) and relate subsequent
levels of labor productivity to this basis. The results are reported in Table E.2 in the Appendix.
The negative effect for the job destruction is fairly persistent, whereas the results for job creation
are to a large extent driven by properties of the estimates, as they disappear once we control for
study characteristics or include all countries and years.
Unlike labor productivity growth, the Gini index of income inequality displays a strong, robust
and positive contemporaneous correlation with alternative measures of job flows. Regardless of
the included controls and sample of countries, higher flows are associated with higher levels of
inequality. One of the exceptions are the estimates which use only the indicators for the gross
worker flows in the literature. However, the analogous estimations based on data from LiTS
regain significance and maintain a positive sign, which points to the low statistical power of
estimates in column (3). Insignificant estimates for job creation in columns (4) and (5)  i.e.
the specifications which include controls for the characteristics of the worker and sample  may
too be explained by lower statistical power. First, note that the size of the estimate in column
(4) is fairly comparable to column (1) for the relation between job creation and inequality, but
the standard errors are twice as large when additional controls are included. When country
and year effects are additionally included (in column (5)) the size of the estimated coefficient
is substantially reduced, which could suggest a considerable role for country hereogeneity. To
account for that, the estimates based on indicators computed on LiTS data include controls for
country effects. Even in the case of smaller samples, the results are all positive and significant 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The positive correlations between both measures of job flows and income inequality seem to
be a fairly universal phenomenon. Such results are indicative of two types of mechanisms: (i) low
 perhaps even insufficient  generosity of the social safety nets in transition countries; (ii) more
dispersed income structures in newly created jobs. Possibly, relative to the old jobs, the newly
created ones offered either substantially worse or substantially better working conditions in terms
of remuneration, wage arrears, etc. A weak and negative correlation between job destruction
and labor productivity growth suggest that the recessionary mechanism was stronger than the
Schumpeterian creative destruction during the process of worker reallocation between jobs.
However, these contemporaneous correlations fail to describe causal relationships. In the next
section we seek to establish long-term effects of labor market flows on aggregate indicators such
as labor productivity and inequality.
5.2 The long-run effects
Given data constraints, providing trend estimations is not feasible. Nonetheless, we can relate
the measures of labor market flows during the transition to subsequent changes in productivity
and inequality. One possible approach is to rely on a lagged dependent variable model, but this
is only possible at the expense of losing observations from early years of transition, as well as
from some countries. Hence, we follow an alternative approach: we provide estimates for the lead
observations of productivity growth and inequality (dependent variable) rather than lags of the
flows (independent variable). The detailed estimates are reported in Table F.1 in the Appendix,
whereas below we present the point estimates with the confidence intervals.
In the reminder of this section we compare the estimates for two samples. We consider the
mean estimate for either job destruction or job creation from the literature for each country and
year pair.16 To avoid confusion of the estimates for job flows and worker flows in the literature,
we only use the figures for the job flows. As analogous from LiTS, we take the indicators of
hirings and separations for the same countries and years. Thus, the literature and LiTS differ
only by the nature of the flows: job or worker.
Figure 1 displays the estimates of correlations for job creations (literature) or hirings (LiTS)
and consecutive values of the labor productivity growth, with the year on the horizontal axis de-
noting the number of years between a given flow and a labor productivity number in a regression.
In total, these are the results from 10 separate regressions, each of 67 observations. In Figure
2 we do the same for the job destructions (literature) or separations (LiTS).17 These estimates
confirm the lack of clear significant pattern between the job creation in the literature and the
rate of labor productivity growth. While these partial correlations are not precisely estimated,
they remain around zero regardless of the time distance between the measured job flow and the
productivity growth. Similarly, the positive link between productivity and hirings obtained from
the LiTS data proves to be consistent and lasting.
The trends described above  the lack of a clear link between job flows and productivity
and the positive relation between worker flows and productivity  might seem contradictory;
16These values are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
17The alternative specifications tested included median rather than mean estimate for a given country in a given
year as well as the use the number of estimates for country-year pair as weights. The results remain unaffected.
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Figure 1: Productivity growth and job creation / hirings
(a) literature (b) LiTS, same countries and years
Note: Estimates from a regression of subsequent leads for productivity growth on the available
estimates of job creation and hirings, leads reported on the horizontal axis, detailed results
reported in Table F.1.
Figure 2: Productivity growth and job destruction / separations
(a) literature (b) LiTS, same countries, same years
Note: Estimates from a regression of subsequent leads for productivity growth on the available
estimates of job destruction and separations, leads reported on the horizontal axis, detailed
results reported in Table F.1.
however, one potential explanation is that the majority of worker flows were not associated with
bankruptcies and start-ups, but rather restructuring and repositioning within the existing firms.
For example, a manufacturing company needing to introduce new products (to stay competi-
tive), modernizes the plants and production lines, which requires a change in the composition
of skills. While net change in employment remains negligible (and thus unrelated to changes in
productivity), the gross worker flows are substantial because of both the change itself and the
churning needed for the new hires to actually match the firms' needs. A similar process may
describe the situation when an existing company needs to develop a back office (e.g. marketing,
logistics, etc.), but automatizes or outsources part of production, downsizing core employment.
The analysis of the long-term relationship between job destruction or separations and pro-
17
ductivity growth partially confirms this intuition. Job destruction rate remained strongly and
positively related to the future labor productivity growth for as long as about five years. Yet,
mostly redundancies bring about this effect, because separations per se remain unrelated to any
future rate of labor productivity growth. This may be interpreted as evidence for the statement
that while restructuring could have been crucial (due to overmanning under the centrally planned
system), higher worker churning does not bring about efficiency gains
Figure 3: Inequality and job creation / hirings
(a) literature (b) LiTS, same countries and years
Figure 4: Inequality and job destruction / separations
(a) literature (b) LiTS, same countries and years
As for the income inequality, the results of Table 4 were indicative of either of the two pos-
sible explanations: (i) insufficient safety nets and (ii) higher wage dispersion in newly created
jobs. We seek to distinguish between these two explanations by repeating the exercise for the
leads of the Gini coefficient. This is done in Figures 3 and 4 for job creation/hirings and job
destruction/separations, respectively.18 The positive correlations between inequality and worker
flows seem to be rather short-term. By contrast, the impulse from job flows tend to re-emerge
in subsequent years. Moreover, in both the job flows and the worker flows, the estimated co-
efficients are positive for creation and destruction alike. Given the relatively persistently high
18Table C.1 discusses the availability of data sources for the indicators of inequality in 2000s, whereas in Table
E.3 we show the results for the alternative indicators. Despite issues with data availability, the results remain
robust to the data source.
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Figure 5: All countries and all years, LiTS
(a) Hiring and productivity growth (b) Separations and productivity growth
(c) Hirings and inequality (d) Separations and inequality
unemployment rates in many of the transition economies as well as the high share of long-term
unemployment, we interpret these results are related to the working conditions more than to the
weak safety nets.
An important question is whether these results reflect general trends or are dependent on
country and period selection. In order to provide an answer, we compute analogous estimates
using all countries and years from LiTS. As revealed by Figures 5a-5b when we consider all
transition countries over the entire decade of 1990s, the business cycle effects still quantitatively
dominate and high churning brings no productivity gain in total. Hirings have a lasting positive
effect on future productivity, whereas the separations exhibit negative correlation in the short-
run. Similarly, the finding concerning income inequality seems to be universal  relatively short-
term strongly positive effects of worker flows on inequality are revealed by the data, see Figures
5c and 5d
The clear pattern for inequality and the much weaker and partial pattern for productivity
growth seem to have at least two explanations. First, worker flows comprise also within industry
changes, for example separations and hirings as well as job destructions and creations within
the contracting public sector. Thus, if new positions exhibit more wage dispersion  e.g. due
to skill biased technological change  one should observe higher income inequality even if job
flows are synchronized. The effects of net job flows and gross worker flows appear to work
in the same direction. Second, many of the transition countries cushioned the labor market
19
adjustments with early retirement schemes, see Fox (1997). Such policies naturally mitigate the
effect separations and job destructions on income inequality if pension benefits are more generous
than the unemployment benefits. Also, such policies break the long-term link between job flows
and inequality.
6 Conclusions
This paper aimed to test empirically if massive and rapid labor reallocation exhibits a link with
productivity growth and income inequality. Such a causal link has been postulated by economic
theory and is appealing as it is fairly intuitive. Moreover, the implications of such link are
of general interest, as periods of intensive labor reallocation occur regularly in advanced and
emerging economies alike. While the policy relevance of this question remains high, typically
contemporaneous data that can be used to address this problem is scarce.
We use the insights from rich, although diversified, literature on labor flows during the tran-
sition from a centrally planned to market economic system in Central and Eastern Europe.
Typically, economic transition from a centrally planned to a market economy produces winners
and losers (i.e. inequality). It has been also believed that the change in the structure of output
has followed the global competitive pressure towards comparative advantage and more productive
sectors. In fact, while some of the transition economies have experienced a spectacular increase
in labor productivity, they also witnessed a surge in income inequality. Admittedly, productivity
growth becomes faster and inequality growth becomes slower with the time from the onset of the
transition.
The exploratory analysis of over 450 estimates provided by the earlier studies reveals some
interesting and still policy relevant patterns. First, against the conventional wisdom, large firms
and public firms (typically state-owned or formerly state-owned) were characterized by net job
destruction rates similar to small firms and private firms. It is rather the lower job creation
rate in the public sector that differentiates the two. Similar phenomena were described by
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2009) in their analysis of sunrising and sunsetting branches of the French
economy, with relevant policy implications. Our results lend the support to these conclusions in
the context of a massive labor reallocation rather than gradual structural adjustment. Moreover,
this channel of adjustment seems to be particularly relevant for massive reallocations, because
neither the estimates from the literature nor the cross-validation from LiTS data confirm the
strong link between job flows and labor productivity growth. In fact, we find little support to
the claim that job creation and productivity exhibit any long-run relationship. In the short-run,
the link between productivity and reallocation is weak and mostly driven by job destructions.
This relation seems to be closer to the standard mechanics of the recessionary pressure than to
the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction.
On the other hand, the link between job flows and inequality is strong, positive and robust
to the country and period selection. Yet, it is rather a short-term phenomenon, which points
to the relevance of wage dispersion in the process of massive labor reallocation. While we do
not analyze social safety nets explicitly, the revealed patterns concerning inequality suggest that
social safety nets  especially income support for elderly permanent labor market quitters 
20
helped to mitigate the perils of transition. Indeed, the long run effects are small. The direct
effects of massive labor reallocation on the wage dispersion with the special emphasis on the
newly created jobs remain to be explicitly analyzed in the future studies.
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A Summary of the available estimates




























































1987 1 1 2
1988 1 1 2
1989 18 1 1 20
1990 1 18 1 20 1 5 1 47
1991 1 18 1 1 6 6 33
1992 1 19 1 1 18 1 1 42
1993 6 19 6 6 2 1 2 42
1994 11 1 23 29 6 14 2 104
1995 1 1 3 1 11 6 5 2 31
1996 1 1 2 2 1 32 4 3 46
1997 1 1 2 2 1 6 4 3 20
1998 1 1 1 6 3 10 22
1999 1 1 4 2 10 18
2000 1 9 1 11




Total 23 5 126 9 59 22 105 12 42 33 454
Note: The number of estimates from each country and year may come





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Exploratory analysis  additional specifications
Table B.1: Additional indicators of labor market flows: quantitative analysis
Gross reallocation Worker flows Job flows
Only public -6.07 -31.24*** -31.24*** -3.67*** -6.97*** -7.34***
(6.94) (9.99) (10.11) (1.22) (2.03) (2.12)
Only manufacturing -1.92 -27.09*** -27.09*** -5.02*** -8.21*** -8.90***
(7.34) (10.94) (10.39) (2.18) (2.25) (2.38)
Only large firms -10.82 -25.66*** -25.66*** -3.54*** -4.92*** -5.16***
(12.34) (13.03) (12.21) (1.75) (2.17) (2.34)
Only small firms 0.26 -14.57* -14.57 19.76*** 9.26*** 8.56**
(8.92) (10.11) (10.23) (4.41) (4.41) (4.87)
Controls for article No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for country No No Yes No No Yes
Controls for year No No Yes No No Yes
hline Observations 85 85 85 345 345 345
R-squared 0.05 0.32 0.44 0.24 0.35 0.40
Net reallocation Worker Flows Job Flows
Only public -13.91*** -26.09*** -26.09*** -3.24*** -5.52*** -6.01***
(5.36) (10.10) (10.56) (1.30) (2.01) (2.44)
Only manufacturing -10.85*** -23.03*** -23.03*** -9.70*** -7.06*** -7.20***
(5.45) (9.86) (11.24) (2.33) (2.26) (2.20)
Only large firms -32.43*** -37.93*** -37.93*** -3.95*** -2.80 -2.58
(11.20) (13.40) (14.42) (1.79) (2.66) (2.66)
Only small firms -6.34 -11.85 -11.85 4.15 0.77 0.96
(7.58) (10.21) (11.05) (4.25) (4.61) (4.32)
Controls for article No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for country No No Yes No No Yes
Controls for year No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 85 85 85 345 345 345
R-squared 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.19
Excess reallocation Worker flows Job flows
Only public 0.97 -11.51*** -11.51*** -3.00*** -3.91*** -4.09***
0) (3.75) (3.37) (0.61) (0.85) (0.95)
Only manufacturing 8.18** -4.30 -4.30 -0.88 -2.45*** -2.66***
(4.20) (6.13) (3.65) (0.82) (1.08) (1.06)
Only large firms -10.28*** -17.76*** -17.76*** 0.49 -1.64* -1.72*
(3.44) (3.49) (3.68) (0.81) (1.03) (1.11)
Only small firms 9.35*** 1.86 1.86 11.86*** 7.64*** 7.36***
(4.50) (4.54) (3.37) (1.91) (1.77) (1.69)
Controls for article No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for country No No Yes No No Yes
Controls for year No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 85 85 85 345 345 345
R-squared 0.17 0.43 0.69 0.34 0.55 0.62
Notes: The table extends the results from Table 3 to additional measures of job reallocation: gross reallocation,
net reallocation and excess reallocation. First three columns correspond to measures of flows based on worker level
data (gross flows) and measures of flows based on firm data (net flows). Bootstrapped (1000 repetitions) standard
errors presented in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at the 5%,10% and 15% confidence level respectively.
29
C Sources of data for productivity and inequality
As with many other variables, the measurement of productivity and productivity changes in tran-
sition countries suffers from information shortages. To the best of our knowledge, the Conference
Board provides the most comprehensive database on productivity in transition economies. In
addition to the data on nominal and real GDP, the database includes less frequently available
variables, such as total number of employees. Conference Board data has also total hours worked,
but this variable is only available as of 1995 for most of the countries in the analyzed literature,
whereas for Ukraine it is missing for the entire period. Thus, we rely on productivity per worker
instead of per hour. As these are aggregate data, one cannot control for the economic sector or
ownership structure. For most countries, the Conference Board provides information on GDP
since 1980, even for territories that by the time were formerly parts of the USSR, such as Ukraine
or Russia in our sample. Conference Board data is also available separately for Czech Republic
and Slovakia already as of 1985.
Given that all countries analyzed in the literature differed in productivity already at the
beginning of transition, we constructed a chain index of per worker productivity, which takes the
countries' average productivity during the 1980's as a reference level, see left panel of Figure C.1.
The patterns described at length in earlier studies exhibit an important dip at the beginning of
the period followed by a recovery, which was faster in Baltic and Central European Countries
than in other former Soviet Union countries. Notably, most of those countries had still in 2000
(and some even in 2010) productivity levels below the 1980's average.
Figure C.1: Productivity chain index (left) and Gini inequality index (right)
In the case of income inequality, data were extracted from the World Income Inequality
Database. This source contains information from almost all countries for an extensive period.
Data are compiled from various sources, sometimes of different nature, which poses a problem
of comparability. Datasets vary on the unit of analysis (individual, household), the units of
measurement (gross or net income, consumption) as well as indicators (e.g. Gini coefficient,
Theil coefficient, percentiles ratios, etc). We report in detail the sources in Table C.1. To assure
maximum coverage and maintain comparability, we work with estimates from Transmonee, which
are based on household level data and use disposable income in local currencies to measure
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inequality. Unfortunately, this source does not cover Estonia, nor some relevant years in the case
of Russia and Ukraine. Thus, we complemented Transmonee data with estimates from additional
sources. For Estonia, we employ measures based on household budget survey published by the
Estonian Statistical Office (since 1993), and indicators from two articles for the remaining years:
Alexeev and Gaddy (1993) for 1990 and Milanovic and Ying (1996) for 1992. For Ukraine, we
complemented the Transmonee data with the results from Kakwani (1996) for 1990-1991 and
Deininger and Squire (1996) for 1996. Finally, in the case of Russia, we used estimates from
the country statistical office and the World Development Indicators. All these indicators refer
to inequality in disposable income measured at household level.
For most transition economies analyzed in the literature, inequality fluctuated, but the ex-
tent of change as well as adjustment paths differed. In the case of Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovenia, increments during the period were negligible and can well be the reflection of measure-
ment errors. Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Poland experienced an initial stark increase
in income inequality, which peaked in mid-1990s and stabilized or even decreased since. Roma-
nia also experienced an increase around that period, but maintained a high level of inequality
afterwards. Indeed, only in some countries (Russia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Estonia) the
Gini index varied considerably. In the remaining, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D A comparison with the alternative data sources
A nagging question in any quantitative analysis of the literature corresponds to the reliability of
the estimates, all the more since authors employed different sources while and in general data
from this period is scarce. To overcome this problem we compare the estimates from the literature
to similarly computed statistics for the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), a comprehensive retro-
spective survey conducted in all former socialist countries, see EBRD (2006), Sanfey and Teksoz
(2006). LiTS rely on worker self-reported information on consecutive jobs held, i.e. it allows
to compute hirings and separations rather than job creation and job destruction. As reporeted
already in Table 3, it is the latter that are more frequently reported in the literature. In order to
allow wider country and period coverage, we compare the estimates from LiTS to estimates from
the literature for job creation and job destruction, i.e. 53 country-year observations.19. When
more than one estimate per country-year is available, we take the mean of them as the reference
point. The choice of the mean as a reference point has little impact on conclusions  we have
tested the specification for median of the available estimates as well as fitted values from Table
3. The results are reported in in Figure D.1 and in Table D.1.
Figure D.1: Correlations between the estimates from the literature and the LiTS data.
In most cases, worker level flows are larger than firm level flows, which confirms the results
from Table 3, with a few notable outliers.20 To test the significance of the linear relation displayed
in Figure D.1 we provide an additional series of tests: a pairwise correlation, and the coefficients
on the variables for 4 sets of regressions: (a) without any additional controls; (b) with country
dummies; (c) with year dummies; (d) with country and year dummies. All coefficients are
positive, whereas worker flows are larger than job flows. With loosing the degrees of freedom
due to higher number of explanatory variables, only one coefficient looses significance. Thus,
the comparison indicates that the estimates from the literature are remarkably similar to those
obtained from the LiTS, especially in job destruction, where the coefficient is close to one.
19The estimates for the 12 data points for countries and years where the literature reports hirings and firings
are available upon request.
20For example, Estonia in 1991 had job destructions close to 16 % of the workforce (more than two standard
deviations away from the mean in the sample).
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Table D.1: The estimates from the literature and LiTS data
Hirings (job creations) Separations (job destructions)
Specification Coefficient Test statistic Coefficient Test statistic
Pairwise correlation 0.449*** 3.553 0.328*** 2.456
OLS - no controls 0.524*** 3.553 0.641*** 2.456
OLS - country dummies 0.345*** 3.196 0.580** 1.829
OLS - year dummies 0.443*** 2.330 0.765*** 2.629
OLS - country and year dummies 0.226 1.461 1.057 *** 2.972
Notes: 53 country-year data points. The dependent variable is the median of job creation (destruc-
tion) in the literature for each country year and the independent variable hirings (separations) from
LiTS data. Standard errors were obtained using bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions. z − ratio for
pairwise correlations and t− statistics for OLS coefficients *,**, *** denote variables significant at
the 15%, 10% and 5% significance levels
34






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.3: Sensitivity analysis: different data sources on inequality  additional specifications
for Table 4
Gini index Literature Literature (+controls) Life in Transition Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transmonee
JC β 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00 0.00 0.00 3.95 1.54*** 1.48*** 0.73* 0.47*
SE (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (2.84) (0.69) (0.56) (0.47) (0.31)
N 231 204 27 227 227 10 26 39 53 92
R2 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.00 0.97 0.26 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.03
JD β 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.01 0.15 -0.01 -1.50 -0.04 0.87* 0.13 0.46**
SE (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (2.80) (0.97) (0.54) (0.46) (0.25)
N 231 204 27 227 227 10 26 39 53 92
R2 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03
WDI
JC β 0.00 0.00 -0.53 -0.01 0.00 3.78 1.92*** 1.04 1.20 -0.17
SE (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (3.85) (0.97) (1.20) (0.91) (0.50)
N 95 91 4 98 95 4 10 12 15 37
R2 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.80 0.45 0.07 0.13 0.00
JD β -0.00 0.01 2.40 0.10 -0.01** 0.84 -0.24 -0.22 -0.35 0.04
SE (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.26) (0.01) (78.38) (1.13) (1.07) (0.75) (0.26)
N 95 91 4 98 95 4 10 12 15 37
R2 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Notes: Table repeats specifications from Table 4 (in the main text) to different subsamples of countries, based
on the available information on inequality by source. The upper panel corresponds to estimates of the Gini
Index from Transmonee (various years) and the lower from the World Development Indicators (WDI). For more




Table F.1: The long-term relationship between job flows and indicators of interest
From the literature From LiTS
Lag no. JC JD Gross Net Excess Hir. Sep. Gross Net Excess
Productivity
0 0.05 -0.25** -0.06 0.17** 0.27 1.09*** 0.12 0.60** -0.74 0.65***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) (0.19) (0.44) (0.50) (0.32) (0.51) (0.27)
1 0.11 0.20 0.12* -0.02 0.42*** 1.22*** -0.04 0.59** -0.68 0.63***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) (0.17) (0.41) (0.47) (0.30) (0.48) (0.25)
2 0.07 0.37*** 0.16* -0.15 0.17 0.81** 0.35 0.56** 0.03 0.40*
(0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.13) (0.22) (0.41) (0.45) (0.29) (0.47) (0.25)
3 0.04 0.42*** 0.16*** -0.20*** 0.16 0.37 0.35 0.34 -0.36 0.35**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.17) (0.34) (0.37) (0.24) (0.39) (0.20)
4 0.08 0.50*** 0.21*** -0.21*** 0.46*** 0.18 0.37 0.26 0.43 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.31) (0.33) (0.22) (0.35) (0.19)
5 0.17** -0.09 0.05 0.17*** 0.04 0.32 -0.16 0.09 0.09 0.04
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.30) (0.33) (0.22) (0.35) (0.19)
6 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.00 -0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 -0.10 0.12
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.29) (0.31) (0.21) (0.33) (0.18)
7 0.10 0.15 0.10* -0.00 0.18 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 -0.04
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.25) (0.26) (0.17) (0.28) (0.15)
8 0.10** 0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.30* 0.19 0.23** 0.05 0.16
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.18) (0.20) (0.13) (0.21) (0.11)
9 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.09 -0.09 0.09
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (0.13)
10 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.35 -0.45* -0.37** -0.17 -0.22
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.27) (0.29) (0.19) (0.31) (0.16)
Inequalities
0 0.31*** 0.51*** 0.32*** -0.04 0.54*** 1.03*** 0.79*** 0.82*** -0.21 0.63***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.14) (0.32) (0.38) (0.22) (0.45) (0.19)
1 -0.19*** 0.03 -0.09* -0.20*** -0.19* 0.53*** 0.15 0.36** -0.47** 0.40***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.25) (0.28) (0.19) (0.27) (0.15)
2 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.31 -0.16 0.08 -0.09 0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (0.13)
3 -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.15*** 0.01 -0.32*** 0.15 -0.19 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.26) (0.14)
4 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.21) (0.23) (0.15) (0.24) (0.13)
5 0.25*** 0.07 0.14*** 0.15** 0.30*** 0.24 0.12 0.17 -0.10 0.15
(0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.20) (0.21) (0.14) (0.22) (0.12)
6 0.08 0.15 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.38** -0.23 0.09 -0.47** 0.20*
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (0.14)
7 -0.20*** 0.23** -0.02 -0.26*** -0.26* 0.13 0.35* 0.22 -0.06 0.18
(0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.22) (0.23) (0.15) (0.25) (0.13)
8 -0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.05 -0.20 0.49*** -0.14 0.19 0.02 0.13
(0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.21) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (0.13)
9 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.02
(0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.26) (0.14)
10 -0.14** -0.23*** -0.13*** -0.02 -0.22** 0.03 -0.22 -0.08 -0.13 -0.02
(0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (0.14)
Notes: Panel on productivity shows the results from regressing leads of productivity growth on values of job flows obtained
from the literature and from the LiTS. Each cell represents a different regression. The number of country-year pairs
(observations) for the productivity estimates - 63. The results from this table were used in Figures 1-2. Panel on inequality
shows the results from regressing leads of the Gini index on values of job flows obtained from the literature and from the
LiTS. The number of country-year observations depends on available information at the country level and it varied from 54
to 67. The results from this table were used in Figures 3-4.
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